ContextOpening address to the 24th International Conference of Banking Supervisors, hosted by Bank Indonesia; the Basel Committee sets global bank standards and must keep supervision effective as risks change quickly.
Why it mattersShifts the Basel Committee's emphasis from post-crisis capital rules towards supervision quality, governance and risk management.
- Weak governance and business models can hide behind satisfactory ratios.
- Supervisors must keep pace with fast-moving technology and risks.
- Qualitative weaknesses eventually become quantitative shocks.
- See, say and act: spot shortcomings promptly and use the available toolkit.
- Keep modernising supervision with better tools and skills.
- Maintain the resilience gained from Basel III while focusing on governance and risk management.
Read the speech summary
1. The challenge
Opening the 24th ICBS, the worldwide gathering of bank supervisors held this year in Bali with Bank Indonesia and the Indonesian financial regulator as hosts, Basel Committee Chair Erik Thedéen asked how supervisors can stay effective amid fast change: AI, cyber threats, new forms of intermediation, geopolitical tension and political pressure on independent authorities. His answer is that supervision must be both strong and modern. Critics often treat the first as rigid and hostile to innovation and the second as a polite word for leniency; he sees the two as complementary, and draws a parallel with Indonesia's history as a trading crossroads that prospered by adapting to change while keeping its footing.
2. Rules are not enough
He recalls what the post-2008 Basel III reforms achieved: core capital ratios of large banks up by over 40% since 2011 to about 14%, the ratio of debt to loss-absorbing capital roughly halved from 30 to 17 times, and liquid assets above a fifth of balance sheets, which helped banks survive the pandemic, rapid rate rises and the 2023 turmoil. He notes in passing that the public searches far more for Basel's rules than for its supervisory principles, and urges full, consistent and timely implementation of the remaining standards. But many failed banks, from Northern Rock to Silicon Valley Bank, met their minimum ratios before collapsing. Weak governance, poor rate-risk management and unstable funding were the real problems. Those hidden weaknesses later turned into losses and runs. A ratio only shows a bank's position on one day; supervision has to follow how it got there, where it is heading and how it would react to a change in conditions. Meeting minimum requirements, he stresses, does not mean the absence of risk, which usually shows up first in incentives, behaviour and concentrations, and the Committee's mandate covers supervision and bank practices as much as rules.
3. What effective supervision means
He defines it as spotting risks early, telling banks clearly what must change, and acting if they do not, all in good time, since an unresolved finding is unfinished work. Acting is hardest: supervisors need judgment to intervene before risks materialise, anchored in mandate, evidence and due process, avoiding both arbitrariness and box-ticking inertia. Because successes are invisible while failures are spectacular, supervision is accused of laxity after crises and of overreach between them; doing the job therefore takes resolve. Past failures show that warning signs were usually visible but not connected or acted upon in time. He defends judgment as a structured, evidence-based assessment that should be challenged internally, documented and reviewed afterwards, since rules alone cannot capture the specific weaknesses of each bank.
4. Capacity and modernisation
Staff, skills, data tools, legal powers, independence, culture and time are, for him, policy matters, and international assessments keep finding shortages of independence, resources and specialists. Tomorrow's supervisors will still need classic prudential knowledge but also expertise in technology, cloud, cyber, data, AI, links with non-banks and geopolitics, combining financial, technological and behavioural expertise in multidisciplinary teams, because a cyber incident can quickly become a liquidity problem and a concentrated business model can unravel when news spreads online. Modernisation should give supervisors more time to think, not just more data to process, and make supervision more forward-looking, data-driven and fast without becoming speculative or careless. Authorities compete with industry for scarce talent, yet underinvestment costs more. AI brings new risks in data quality, models, explainability and dependence on a few providers, addressed in the Committee's new third-party risk principles; small banks, most reliant on outside AI tools, must still keep responsibility in-house.
5. Commitments and cooperation
He proposes three commitments: protect mandates, independence, resources and early-intervention powers before a crisis; give staff expertise, time and backing to challenge bank leaders; and build trust by explaining how decisions are taken and evaluated, without hiding behind confidentiality. Finally, he presents international cooperation, as at the conference first held in 1979, as a form of capacity in itself, warning that fragmented supervision would breed fragmented finance and regulatory arbitrage.