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Overview of economic and financial developments in Italy

· Fabio Panetta, Governor of the Banca d'Italia (Italy)

Summary written by Dark Majestic in its own words · topics: trade, fragmentation and geopolitics, development and emerging economies, growth, investment and productivity, technology, ai and cyber risk

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· Fabio Panetta Wiki · Banca d'Italia WikiOverview of economic and financial developments in Italy

ContextConcluding remarks by Fabio Panetta, Governor of the Bank of Italy, at a meeting for the presentation of the Annual Report 2025 – 132nd Financial Year, Rome, 29 May 2026.

Why it mattersThe Bank of Italy's yearly concluding remarks are Italy's main economic assessment; this one stresses small firm size and weak intangible investment.

Problems raised
  1. International trade may weaken under tariffs and Chinese competition.
  2. Italian firms are small and slow to adopt new technology.
  3. Too little investment in research, software and intangibles.
Solutions proposed
  1. Help firms scale up and innovate.
  2. Increase investment in intangible assets.
  3. Build on AI-driven investment to support growth.
Read the speech summary

1. A resilient year, then a new shock

In his concluding remarks on the Bank of Italy's annual report for 2025, the Governor noted that world output grew 3.4% in 2025, half a point above forecasts, despite wars and US tariffs. The United States grew over 2%, pushed by AI investment in data centres and by stock market gains that lifted consumption. China grew 5% by cutting export prices and finding new markets, a strategy that fails to address domestic deflation and invites protectionism. Easier monetary policy also helped. Markets showed signs of excess: high valuations, thin risk premiums, a search for yield in opaque segments, and rallies in gold, bitcoin and private credit, some of which reversed in 2025-26. The Gulf conflict then changed everything. Hormuz normally carries a fifth of global oil and LNG; its blockade lifted oil prices everywhere and gas prices in Europe and Asia but not in the United States. Fertiliser prices jumped, which will raise food prices early next year and could push tens of millions into extreme poverty. Inflation and short-term expectations are rising, and markets expect central banks to react, lifting rates at all maturities.

2. A fragile outlook

Energy costs cut household incomes and company margins, higher yields tighten financing and public debt limits support. Assuming a quick end to the conflict, the IMF expects world growth of 3.1% in 2026 and inflation of 4.4%; a longer war would be worse. Damage to energy infrastructure, high shipping and insurance costs and persistent uncertainty will weigh on spending. He stressed that today's risks are more numerous, more interconnected and harder to govern than before. Investors first fled to safety, lifting the dollar and pulling money from emerging markets; shares have since recovered, perhaps underestimating the damage, while rising long-term yields signal continuing tension. With heavy public debt and growing non-bank fragilities, small shocks can spread widely.

3. Trade and fragmentation

World trade grew 5% in 2025 as flows were rerouted and tariffs ended lower than announced; roughly half of the extra goods traffic was linked to AI equipment. Tariffs did not shrink the US goods deficit, as about 90% of their cost fell on American consumers and firms, while China's surpluses grew. The IMF warns that lasting barriers could slow trade growth below 3% in 2026. Governments rightly seek economic security, but indiscriminate fragmentation would raise costs, weaken supply chains and undermine cooperation, harming the citizens it aims to protect. The post-war rules-based system governed tensions for eighty years; its erosion through uneven rule enforcement, distorting industrial policies, imbalances and unequal gains must be addressed, and ties with countries that respect shared rules strengthened.

4. Global imbalances

Current account imbalances in 2025 reached their widest since the 2008 crisis. About two-thirds of all deficits are American, the result of large public deficits and low household saving; roughly a third of all surpluses are Chinese, since its model holds back consumption and favours exports; Europe's surplus reflects its difficulty in turning savings into innovative investment. America's net external debt equals about 90% of GDP. Large surpluses push global real rates down, encouraging risk-taking and borrowing, while deficit countries face sudden jumps in risk premiums. The energy shock may narrow imbalances temporarily but not their causes. A lasting fix requires a smaller US budget deficit, stronger Chinese consumption with less distorting industrial policy and more currency flexibility, and much more investment and a fully integrated single market in Europe; coordinated, the IMF estimates these steps would lift world GDP by 1%. Unmanaged imbalances tend to end in trade conflict, as before the 1985 Plaza Accord, or in financial crises, as before 2008.

5. Artificial intelligence and work

AI is spreading faster than earlier technologies. Five large US firms control about three-quarters of global computing power, most frontier models are American, China is catching up and Europe lags; yet the biggest gains usually go to those who adopt a technology, not those who invent it. AI is improving factory design, maintenance and logistics and speeding up drug discovery. For the first time it can perform highly cognitive tasks, but past innovations also created new occupations: six in ten US workers today do jobs that did not exist eighty years ago, and cheaper products can expand demand. The transition will hurt workers unable to switch and may widen inequality, so adoption by small firms, skills training and protection for exposed workers are essential. Work itself will change: in some jobs AI will assist people and free them for higher-value tasks, in others the human role will centre on interpreting results, exercising judgement and ensuring reliability, the parts automation cannot replace.

6. Europe: slower growth and the policy response

Euro area growth was 1.4% in 2025, about 1% excluding Ireland, held back in Germany and Italy by manufacturing hit by Chinese competition, while households kept saving. Inflation returned to 2%, allowing a 100 basis point cut in rates. Since March, confidence has dropped to 2022 levels, services weakened and banks tightened lending. ECB March projections showed growth of 0.9% in 2026 and inflation of 2.6% in the baseline, but a prolonged conflict could subtract a point of growth over two years and push inflation above 6%. Conditions are better than in 2021-22: rates are near neutral, demand is weaker, expectations are anchored and wages calm. Still, firms plan price rises and consumers expect more inflation, so the stance may need recalibrating to prevent a wage-price spiral; the June decision would depend on new projections, with no predetermined path. Acting in a timely and measured way, he said, protects household purchasing power, business confidence and the basis for durable growth, and the calibration would depend on how far energy costs filter into the wider basket and how strongly they depress spending and investment.

7. European policy gaps

Europe enters this unstable period with unresolved weaknesses that limit its growth and global weight. It faces dependence in defence, energy and technology and an incomplete single market in finance, energy and telecoms. Initiatives under the Competitiveness Compass, such as the Industrial Accelerator Act, a common European company form and the grids package, could help, but fewer than half of the planned proposals have been presented and under a quarter adopted. AI plans are delayed too, although the EU has rules, a strategy, investment programmes, rich industrial data and strong research; no call for tenders for AI gigafactories had been published by mid-May. Long negotiations, diluted compromises, uneven national application and unspent resources must be overcome, as credibility depends on delivery. Europe's savings flow abroad because capital markets remain national; beyond the savings and investments union, he called for a common European bond backed by shared fiscal capacity to provide a safe asset, fund common projects and strengthen the euro.

8. Italy: resilience but weak productivity

Since 2019 Italian GDP has risen over 6%, better than the euro area per person, driven by investment and exports, employment has risen strongly, and the country's net foreign position, deeply negative a decade ago, has turned positive at 15% of GDP, helped by prudent public finances. Growth slowed to 0.5% in 2025 as real wages lagged and Germany struggled, and the Gulf war may bring stagnation. Output per hour in the private sector has grown only 6% since 2000, against 13-34% in other large euro economies, while the working-age population is shrinking. Recovery plan spending exceeded €100 billion over 2021-25, about 30% of investment, adding nearly a point to annual growth and speeding up public tenders; private firms, which hold ample own funds, must now invest more in innovation and intangible assets.

9. AI adoption, skills and energy in Italy

About 30% of Italian firms use AI but only 5% intensively, below EU averages; adoption could add 0.2 to over 1 point a year to labour productivity, enough in the best case to offset demographic decline. He warned against repeating the 1990s, when slow adoption of information technology held back productivity for decades. Small firms face upfront costs, skill shortages, legal uncertainty and data protection concerns, and individual firms ignore the benefits that spread along supply chains, so he proposed stronger technology transfer, support for start-ups and venture capital, public procurement of innovation, AI in public administration and clear EU rules. Only 30% of people in their thirties hold a degree, 20% of young adults without a degree are out of both work and education, twice the rate elsewhere, more than 100 000 graduates emigrated in 2020-24 and education spending is a point of GDP below the EU average, a vicious circle of weak demand for skills and weak supply. Energy imports transfer wealth abroad; efficiency has improved, renewables reached 41% of electricity, grids are being expanded and new nuclear technologies deserve study, while support measures should stay temporary and targeted.

10. Banks and conclusion

Italian banks are profitable and well capitalised; smaller lenders are weaker, and recent problems at a few stemmed from poor governance, handled without contagion, and the exit of the weakest lenders has strengthened the sector. Large banks are spending on technology at levels comparable to European peers, while digital services attract younger customers; the Bank of Italy is attentive to less digitally skilled customers exposed to exclusion and scams. Mergers can help if competition, especially locally, is preserved, bringing Italy's banking structure closer to that of other large European countries and diversifying revenues; the five largest groups hold 68% of assets, less than in most peers. Lending has recovered but publicly guaranteed loans, over a fifth of business credit, should return to their targeted role, and equity finance must grow. IT incidents at banks rose 80% in 2023-25 and cyber incidents doubled; AI tools able to find system flaws quickly require stronger governance and DORA implementation. Recalling the 1946 choice of the Republic and of an open, rules-based world, he urged Europe to act together, Italy to invest in technology, skills and debt reduction, and governments to steer AI so that it serves people and gives young generations opportunities. Rules agreed at global level should protect competition, pluralism and the dignity of work, and success will be measured by the chances offered to young people to use their skills, be rewarded on merit and stay in the country.

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